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The defendants-appellees Prodata, Inc. ("Prodata") and 
Will McCoy ("McCoy"), through counsel, submit this brief in 
reply to the Brief of Appellee ("Appellee's Brief") submitted by 
the plaintiff-appellee John P. Pratt ("Pratt"). 
REPLY TO APPELLEE' S STATEMENT QF CASE 
Pratt and McCoy offer the following observations 
regarding the Statement of the Case set forth in Appellee' s 
Brief: 
1. Allegations of Falsehood—In his exposition of 
the allegations on which this action is based at pages 3 and 4 
of Appellee' s Brief, Pratt fails to note that his First Cause of 
Action, the sole claim that went to the jury, specifically 
alleged that "Defendants have made false and deceptive 
representations" and that these "representations made by 
Defendants were false, and defendants knew or should have known 
of such falsity. . . . " (R. 2-13 at paragraphs 25 and 29. )J 
2. Issues Preserved from the Trial--At footnote 3 of 
Appellee's Brief, page 5, Pratt seems to suggest that issues 
remain in this action with respect to the correctness of the 
trial court' s instructions to the jury on the element of 
improper means under Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 
P. 2d 293 (Utah 1982). However, the record does not reflect any 
cross-appeal with respect to the trial court's handling of these 
*The references to the record and exhibits in this Reply 
Brief follow the format previously adopted in the Appellants' 
Brief at p. 4, fn. 1. References to the Addendum are to the 
attachments to the Brief of Appellants dated August 26, 1991. 
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issues. As a consequence, under the most basic principles of 
appellate practice, these points are no longer issues in this 
action and the trial court' s ruling is law of the case. See, 
e. g. , Tracv v. University of Utah Hospital. 619 P. 2d 340, 342 
(Utah 1980); Detonics ".45" Associates v. Bank of California. 97 
Wash. 2d 351, 644 P. 2d 1170, 1172 (1982) (M [sjince plaintiffs did 
not appeal the finding by the trial court . . . , this becomes 
the law of the case"). 
3. The Act of Interference—Pratt' s five-page 
Statement of the Facts at pages 6 through 10 of Appellee' s Brief 
is most telling in its almost entire neglect of the central 
event of the case—the moment of interference by Prodata and 
McCoy. This crucial contact is summarized on page 9 in the 
single phrase: "McCoy met with UDOT officials on several 
occasions to discuss Hartle and Pratt. " Clearly, where one 
seeks to hold another liable for intentional interference with 
economic relations through improper purpose, the nature of the 
actual interference is of more than passing interest. The 
evidence at trial showed, at most, three meetings between UDOT 
and McCoy—one merely a meeting to set up a meeting and another 
occurring after the decisions to terminate Pratt had been made. 
(T. 225-26, 355-56. ) Significantly, the meetings dealt with 
both Hartle and Pratt; Pratt was not singled out. To the 
contrary, based on the most contemporary and neutral account, 
Pratt was incidental to the discussion. (Addendum 3. ) 
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ARGUMENT 
I, THE JURY' S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS SPOKE 
TRUTHFULLY PRECLUDES THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR 
INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
Pratt offers three reasons why the defendants' 
transmission of truthful information, as the jury found, was 
actionable. None of these reasons is sufficient to prevent 
entry of judgment in favor of Prodata and McCoy. 
A. Truth Is Not A "New Affirmative Defense." 
Pratt's characterization of truth as a "new 
affirmative defense" overlooks the record in this action. As 
noted above, Pratt himself put the truth of the defendants' 
statements in issue with the filing of his Complaint. In other 
words, relying solely on the transmission of information for the 
alleged interference, Pratt undertook the burden of proving in 
the first instance that the offending words were false. The 
defendants denied this allegation and thus put Pratt to his 
proof. (R. 90-104 at paragraphs 25 and 29. ) This procedure 
comports with the highly analogous area of defamation in which 
the plaintiff would have the burden of proving the falsity of 
the statement as a predicate to recovery. See Philadelphia 
Newspapers. Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986); Caruso 
v. Local Union No. 690, 107 Wash. 2d 524, 730 P. 2d 1299. 1302 
(1987) ("as a private defamation plaintiff, [one] has the burden 
of proving falsity"). 
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B. The Jury Made the Requisite Finding. 
Pratt insists that the jury's finding at Special 
Verdict 3(a) does not suffice to establish that McCoy 
transmitted truthful information to UDOT. The jury was asked: 
"Did the defendants make a false statement about a presently 
existing fact to the Utah Department of Transportation?" To 
this, the jury responded: "No." (R. 701.) Inasmuch as Pratt 
relied solely on the transmission of information in alleging 
wrongful interference, the finding that no falsehood was 
communicated to UDOT is the same as finding that any alleged 
interference involved only truthful information. Further, Pratt 
offers no authority for the apparent suggestion that the 
application of a clear and convincing standard renders the 
jury' s finding inapposite. As already noted, in the absence of 
a cross-appeal, Pratt' s problems with the trial court' s 
instructions to the jury are not properly before this Court on 
appeal. 
C. Consistency and Sound Policy Dictate that 
Truthful Information Not Be an Acceptable Basis 
for a Claim of Wrongful Interference with 
EgQnpmic Rglrtipns. 
Pratt argues, without citation to authority, that the 
issue of truth is relevant only to a consideration of the 
improper means alternative under the Leigh Furniture test for 
wrongful interference with economic relations. Admittedly, 
there is no authority explaining how Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 772(a) (1979) relates to application of the Oregon 
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definition of the tort of wrongful interference adopted by this 
Court in Leigh Furniture. However, the Wisconsin and Wyoming 
authorities cited in Appellants' Brief at pages 14 and 15 
clearly undermine the conclusion urged by Pratt that an improper 
purpose can make truth telling, absent more, an adequate basis 
for a finding of wrongful interference. 
In the end, the issue is one of consistency and public 
policy. The transmission of truthful information is not only a 
proper means--it is a constitutional right. The analogy with 
the law of defamation has already been noted. (In fact, comment 
b to Section 772 refers the reader to Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 581A (1977) which states: "One who publishes a 
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for 
defamation if the statement is true. ") Comment a to Section 
581A notes that constitutional provisions making truthful 
defamatory statements actionable if made for "malicious motives" 
(the very result advocated by Pratt) have been held to violate 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, 
e. g. , Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); 
Wright v. Southern Mono Hospital District, 631 F. Supp. 1294, 
1326 (E.D. Cal. 1986) ("Truth of the statements made is a 
complete defense against civil liability for defamation, 
regardless of bad faith or malicious purpose" [emphasis added]). 
Pratt should not be allowed to secure under the guise 
of "wrongful interference" what he would be denied under the law 
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of defamation--money damages for the transmission of truthful 
information. Not only is such a result inconsistent, it runs 
counter to the policies underlying the tort of wrongful 
interference. That tort seeks to balance two societal 
interests--the interest in unfettered commercial activity and 
the interest in being free from improper interference by others 
in the pursuit of such activity. When such a claim is based 
solely on the transmission of information, a third interest of 
constitutional proportions is implicated—the right to freely 
speak the truth. That interest is preeminent, particularly in 
the functioning of our free enterprise system. The flow of 
truthful information, no matter how much that information hurts, 
drives our financial markets, our consumer purchases, and our 
corporate business decisions. 
If the constitutional protection such information 
receives can be overridden with a simple allegation of "improper 
purpose," then more commercial entities than Prodata stand at 
risk. For instance, the stockbroker who recommends against the 
purchase of a security based on accurate information known to 
her must nonetheless answer to the jury for her motive when the 
seller of the security alleges wrongful interference. 
Similarly, the merchant who correctly notes the difference in 
quality between his product and that of a competitor must still 
face trial on the issue of improper purpose. In the present 
action, McCoy' s truthful statements regarding the covenant not 
to compete have become the basis for a money judgment because of 
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the jury's assessment that they were made with an improper 
purpose. This result contradicts the basic expectation of the 
marketplace that one is permitted to tell the truth without fear 
of legal action. It provides every disgruntled competitor with 
an avenue to settle commercial scores under the heading of 
wrongful interference. This is bad policy for both the courts 
and the free market. 
II. PRATT HAS FAILED TO POINT TO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
THAT WOULD SUPPORT A REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT, IN 
CONTACTING UDOT, DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH A PREDOMINANT 
PURPOSE TO HURT PRATT FOR THE SAKE OF INJURY ALONE. 
Pratt was required to prove at trial that, on 
September 28 and 29, 1989, McCoy spoke to UDOT regarding Pratt 
with a "predominant purpose," not to further Prodata's economic 
interests, but to hurt Pratt for "the sake of injury alone." 
Leigh Furniture, supra, 657 P. 2d at 307-08. In Appellee' s 
Brief, Pratt cites no direct evidence of McCoy' s intent during 
the relevant two-day period. (In fact, all direct evidence--
from McCoy and from UDOT--indicates a pure economic motive. ) 
Pratt seeks to rely on "reasonable inferences" drawn from 
"competent evidence," Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P. 2d 693, 695-96 
(Utah 1982), but is ultimately forced to advance evidence that 
would support the element of improper purpose, if at all, only 
with an overwhelming measure of "surmise, speculation, or 
conjecture." Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N. W. 2d 791, 800 
(Iowa 1984) ("Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a 
suspicion; it must amount to proof"). 
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A. Pratt' s Manipulation of the Evidence. 
The Brief of Appellants filed August 26, 1991 provides 
the Court with the entire relevant testimony of Pratt' s 
witnesses without editing, commentary or transposition. (In his 
Appellee's Brief, Pratt has not cited to any significant 
additional testimony. ) What Prodata and McCoy have cited to 
this Court is what the jury actually heard and the record on 
which the jury's verdict must rest. In contrast, Pratt in 
Appellee's Brief has offered this Court a mere commentary on the 
evidence with only minimal quotations and essentially no 
context. QJL, Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence: Monlux v. 
General Motors Corp. , 714 P. 2d 930, 935 (Hawaii 1986). 
Prodata and McCoy respond to the Appellee Brief s 
characterization of the evidence on a witness-by-witness basis 
as follows: 
1. Roger Claws on (Appellee's Brief, p.15)--Pratt 
contends that McCoy was "very unhappy" (apparently quoting Roger 
Clawson) with Pratt for "no legitimate business reason." 
However, the actual testimony of Roger Clawson was as follows: 
"[T]he subject of John Pratt came up and the gist of the 
conversation was that Will was unhappv with John Pratt' s conduct 
of terminating his contract and going to work directly for a 
client." (Addendum 10; emphasis added. ) As recounted by Mr. 
Clawson, McCoy linked his unhappiness directly to Pratt' s 
termination of his contract. The jury could hardly believe 
McCoy was "unhappy" and then disregard his further admission as 
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to the business reason for his unhappiness. Certainly there was 
nothing in this exchange to provide even circumstantial evidence 
of a purpose six months later to hurt Pratt for the sole sake of 
inflicting pain. 
B. Glen Read (Appellee's Brief, p. 15)--Pratt 
contends that McCoy had no business reason for telling Mr. Read 
to "stay away" from Pratt. In fact, Mr. Read testifies that 
McCoy told him "not [to] have any dealings with Mr. Pratt 
because he believed that he was a bad influence. . . . " 
According to Mr. Read, McCoy accused Pratt of doing "several 
things that were professional unethical" and "that he had done 
things that were far worse than anything I knew about." Mr. 
Read then admitted that he himself was aware of conduct on the 
part of Pratt that he deemed to be "inappropriate." (Addendum 
11. ) That conduct, as disclosed by Mr. Read, was indisputably 
business related. 
For his part, McCoy freely admitted that he directed 
Prodata employees (including presumably Mr. Read) to stay away 
from Pratt: 
Q. You don' t remember any instances of telling 
anyone to stay away from John Pratt? 
A. I have done that, but I explained why. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. Because when Mr. Pratt left the subcontract 
arrangement in March of 1989, to me he appeared 
to be very bitter, he had some negative words 
about our company, and I asked our employees that 
it would be best if they stayed away from him 
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because his attitude was not the best and I told 
them that he did not care for Pro-Star. 
Q. You' re not aware of anything bad that John 
Pratt' s done or that you would consider bad, are 
you? 
A. I'm not. 
Q. You never told anybody that John Pratt' s done 
anything bad, have you? 
A. No, I have not. 
(T. 169-70. ) 
Again, with this testimony and that of Mr. Read, Pratt 
wants to modify, and then to cut and paste. McCoy testified as 
to the business purpose of his admonitions to stay away from 
Pratt. For his part, Mr. Read freely acknowledged a business 
justification for the accusation of misconduct. On the other 
hand, McCoy denied knowing or saying anything bad about Pratt. 
To concoct sufficient evidence, Pratt now asks this Court to 
accept that the jury believed McCoy' s protestations of ignorance 
of any wrongdoing, but disbelieved his denial in the same 
breath that he made any accusations of wrongdoing. Then, to 
complete the scenario, Pratt contends that the jury must believe 
Mr. Read' s testimony as to McCoy' s accusations, but disbelieve 
Mr. Reid' s testimony regarding the business justification 
arising from Pratt' s questionable conduct. It is all a bit 
confusing and, in the end, unavailing. This mixing of the 
evidence does not "raise a suspicion," much less "amount to 
proof," that McCoy entertained malice toward Pratt that overrode 
all other motivations when, nearly five months later, McCoy 
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approached UDOT regarding Pratt' s breach of the covenant not to 
compete, 
C. Christopher Crocker (Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-16)-
-Pratt errs in citing Mr. Crocker for the proposition that 
McCoy, in June, 1989, accused Pratt "of taking contracts away 
from Prodata and violating his non-compete obligation to 
Prodata. . . . " Rather, in his testimony, Mr. Crocker was 
careful to note that Pratt' s name was not mentioned: 
A. Okay. What I have to do is back up in time. Not 
knowing at the time who John Pratt was and not 
having his name mentioned, a statement at a 
luncheon by Mr. McCoy and also backed up by Mr. 
Basham was that contractors had taken contracts, 
consequently, money away from Pro-Star, that they 
had violated their no compete clause and Pro-Star 
intended to make an example of them. 
(Addendum 9, emphasis added. ) 
There is absolutely no evidence that McCoy was actually 
referring to Pratt. 
Even if McCoy were referring to Pratt and the jury 
chose to believe Mr. Crocker' s testimony, all that is proven is 
that McCoy did indeed have knowledge of Pratt' s breach of the 
covenant not to compete at an earlier date than McCoy himself 
acknowledged in his testimony. It will not do to say that the 
jury believed McCoy's professions of ignorance and then believed 
that he manufactured the June, 1989 claim of breach to which Mr. 
Crocker testified. This certainly is not what Mr. Cocker 
believed: 
Q. [Y]ou understood all along and throughout this 
thing what was motivating those statements was 
-12-
the fact that somebody at Pro-Star believed there 
had been a violation of some noncompetition 
clauses, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And throughout the time as you observed those 
individuals who were making these statements, Mr. 
McCoy specifically, it was clear that he 
sincerely believed that that was the case. 
A. That' s my belief. 
(Addendum 9. ) 
On another point, McCoy' s apparent pleasure after 
meeting with Pratt and Hartle (a meeting that neither Pratt nor 
Hartle nor McCoy remembered) proves nothing regarding McCoy' s 
state of mind in contacting UDOT. Pratt offers no explanation 
for how an open demonstration of pleasure in the advantage over 
a competitor makes the fact that McCoy hated Pratt and wished 
him harm for harm' s sake alone any more likely than a more 
benign, competitive motive. 
D. Ronald Hartle (Appellee's Brief, p. 16)--Contrary 
to Pratt' s assertion in Appellee' s Brief, Hartle testified that 
Mr. Basham, and not McCoy, told Mr. Hartle that "he [Basham] 
would take whatever means he could to get [Hartle] out of UDOT." 
(Addendum 13.) There is no principle of law that transforms Mr. 
Basham' s statement into that of McCoy. Further, Mr. Basham' s 
statement as recited by Mr. Hartle is not one of intent, but a 
representation as to the action Mr. Basham intended to take. It 
is mere speculation to read into the remarks a motive to hurt as 
opposed to a purpose to protect Prodata' s long-term economic 
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interests. And it approaches the realm of purest surmise to 
conclude that any intent inferred was also directed at Pratt and 
was shared by McCoy. As with the examples previously cited, 
Pratt strings such conjectures together like so many misfit 
tinker toys resulting in a construction of the evidence that is 
as unwieldy as it is absurd. 
E. Charl es Chri s t ens en (Appellee's Brief, p. 16)--
Prodata' s failure to first contact Pratt regarding his breach of 
the covenant not to compete proves nothing with respect to 
McCoy's purpose in contacting UDOT. There is no principle of 
law that requires a party to first contact the offending party 
before alleging a breach of contract or be deemed to have acted 
with malicious intent. Charles Christensen most aptly and 
conclusively recalled that McCoy described his dealings with 
UDOT as a "business arrangement." (Addendum 12. ) Such an 
admission, if believed (as Pratt clearly feels it should be), 
belies the notion that the defendants acted with any overriding 
desire to hurt Pratt for the sake of injury alone rather than 
with a "legitimate long-range economic motivation." 
B. The Evidence Will Not Support The Finding That 
The Defendants Acted With An Improper Purpose. 
To evaluate McCoy' s purpose in contacting UDOT, The 
jury had to get inside of McCoy's mind. This is a treacherous 
inquiry even with the clearest of evidence. This Court 
recognized in Leigh Furniture "[the] [p]roblems inherent in 
proving motivation or purpose. . . . " 657 P. 2d at 307. Such 
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problems are legion on the record in this action. Pratt has 
failed to cite to any evidence on which the jury could have 
based a finding that Prodata or McCoy entertained any desire to 
injure Pratt "as an end in itself" or "for the sake of injury 
alone. " Leigh Furniture, 657 P. 2d at 307-08. Even more remote 
from the actual evidence before the jury is evidentiary support 
for the essential proposition that such a malicious motive 
predominated over all other motives. Even Pratt' s 
characterization of the evidence, which is neither the testimony 
actually heard by the jury nor a fair reading of that testimony, 
fails to meet the sufficiency of the evidence test. 
III. THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT WAS NOT THE LEGAL CAUSE OF 
PRATT' S LOSS. 
Pratt fails to meet the thrust of the defendants' 
argument with respect to proximate cause. At the outset, the 
sole significance of the defendants' concession regarding cause 
in fact is that the jury' s finding in this regard appears to be 
supported by evidence sufficient under the applicable legal 
standard and, therefore, not worth serving as the basis of an 
appeal. However, under Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction 
Co. , 701 P. 2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985), that factual finding does 
not end the inquiry as to proximate or legal cause. This Court 
must apply "considerations of common sense and policy" to 
determine whether the acts of the defendants are the proximate 
cause of Pratt' s loss. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hospital, 
Inc. , 741 P. 2d 467, 470 (Okl. 1987). Pratt does not dispute his 
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clear testimony at trial that he utterly refused any settlement 
with Prodata (the party in the right) that did not require a 
complete capitulation on the part of Prodata. Pratt himself 
broke off all negotiations with Prodata. Despite his clear 
violation of a valid covenant not to compete and UDOT" s 
unequivocal explanation of the long-term adverse consequences to 
Pratt flowing from a failure to settle matters with Prodata, 
Pratt accepted the inevitable loss of over $84,000 in contracts 
with UDOT rather than pay a penny to Prodata. 
In the final analysis, Pratt was the master of his own 
destiny. However improper Prodata' s purpose might be deemed, 
the termination by UDOT could have been reversed through a 
simple compromise. Hartle did so and returned to work. Pratt 
elected to reject compromise and ended up in litigation seeking 
damages arising directly from that refusal to settle. The 
policy of this Court should be that those who walk with eyes 
open into a situation which will result in loss cannot blame 
another for those losses. Common sense dictates this result in 
the present action. Prodata should not bear the damages 
resulting from Pratt' s free choices over which Prodata had 
absolutely no control. 
IV. PRATT HAS OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY' S 
RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTERCLAIM. 
Pratt has failed to cite this Court to any evidence on 
which the jury could have based a finding that Pratt's breach of 
the covenant not to compete did no harm to Prodata' s goodwill. 
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Pratt misses the point in contending that the project on which 
he was working when he left Prodata suffered no harm and that he 
continued to do his contract work for Prodata while secretly 
working for UDOT in March and April, 1989. As this Court has 
repeatedly emphasized, the sole legitimate purpose for a 
covenant not to compete is to protect an employer' s goodwill in 
a valuable employee. See System Concepts Inc. v. Dixon, 669 
P. 2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983); Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P. 2d 
823, 827 (Utah 1951). Thus, the damages Pratt claims not to 
have caused are unrelated to those to be avoided through 
enforcement of the covenant not to compete. 
The mere fact that Pratt knew one of the individuals 
with whom he worked at UDOT for a period of time before Pratt 
was employed with Prodata does nothing to disprove an injury to 
Prodata' s goodwill. At trial, Pratt acknowledged that it was 
under the terms of the Employment Agreement containing the 
covenant not to compete (Ex. 11) that he first went to work for 
UDOT. (T. 52. ) Further, the very UDOT employee who previously 
knew Pratt reviewed Pratt' s employment contract with McCoy in 
connection with a UDOT project. (T. 322. ) In other words, 
Pratt first entered UDOT and thereafter worked at UDOT under the 
Prodata banner. In that capacity, he engendered much goodwill 
for Prodata as evidenced by UDOT' s willingness to hire him even 
while he was still working on another project for Prodata. The 
covenant not to compete was tailored specifically to protect 
that goodwill. The liquidated damages clause enforcing that 
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covenant was intended to constitute a reasonable estimate of 
these most real but elusive damages. Given the complete absence 
of evidence in the record refuting the fact of an injury to 
Prodata, the jury's finding as to the Counterclaim must be set 
aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Pratt has failed to advance law or facts of record 
that would support the resolution of this matter in the trial 
court. In contrast, the defendants have demonstrated that the 
jury's findings and the trial court's application of the law are 
without adequate basis. This Court should reverse the Judgment 
of the trial court and enter Judgment in favor of the defendants 
on both the Complaint and the Counterclaim. 
DATED this / ' day of November, 1991. 
VAN C O T ^ BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Eric C. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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